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The Japanese Challenge 
To the Editor: 
When I wrote what Orbis entitled "Target Japan as America's Economic Foe," 
I recognized that my suggestions for change in U.S. policy would be controversial. .. : 
One of my purposes was to help stimulate a debate on the future of U.S.-Japanese ·· 
relations, which I believe to be essential for that relationship to remain healthy. 
I certainly expected to receive criticism from some quarters. However, I expected 
the criticism to focus on what I said. In addition, I expected critics either to . 
strongly defend existing U.S. policy or to pose alternatives they deem superior· 
to my proposals Instead, the critiques by Edward Hudgins and Robert Elegant 
were filled with attacks on what I did not say or on what I explicitly disavowed. 
Their critiques - which may have been led astray by the editorial substitution 
of the word "foe" . for "challenge" in the title after the page proof stage -
represent a gross misrepresentation of my analysis and proposals. In fact, I 
have seldom seen so many strawmen assembled in so few pages. 
The thrust of my piece was that the economic challenge posed by the 
rivalry between the United States and Japan is an excellent focal point for 
American foreign policy as it adjusts to post-cold war structural changes in the 
global world economic order and for domestic policy as the U.S. economy 
adjusts to global competition at home. Japan is the "target" partially because 
··its economic challenge helped to precipitate the post-cold war rest:nicturing 
and partially because it is in the lead of the East Asian portion of what is, of 
course, a global challenge. _ _ 
. · Space does not permit a line-by-line rebuttal to the two Critiques, but 
·I shall respond to the major points each makes. First, let me 5ay that I agree 
with Hudgins (and my article makes this clear) that ''.Japan's prosperity is not 
·a danger." In fact, I emphasized that Japan is not a "threat" or an "enemy" in 
the 'common usage of either word. This is why the unsolicited use of the word 
· "foe" in the title is regrettable. Hudgins attacks me for treating Japan as an 
enemy and his critique repeatedly uses the words "danger" and "threat," whereas 
my analysis makes an explicit point that the United States faces a "challenge" 
· from an economic rival and disavows the stronger words that so easilf exacerbate 
overall bilateral relations. There is a profound difference between these twO 
levels of analysis, which I accept and incorporate in my article. Yet, Hudgins 
repeatedly blurs these distinctions and criticizes me for treating Japan like an 
enemy in a neo-<:old war zero-sum situation. He used the "zero-sum" attack 
twice in his critique. In fact, I did no such thing and emphasized that the rivalry 
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between the United States and Japan as economic adversaries is "not a zero-sum 
contest." In short, both can win - and probably will - if Americans cope 
adequately with the seriousness of the challenge in a "non-hostile fashion." 
The reason that strawman was raised may have been made clear in 
Hudgins's critique of my analysis of economic factors and appropriate bureau-
cratic responses. He evidently is a free market dogmatist, which I am not. I 
think most successful economies can, and should, accept a limited government 
role in assisting private sector activities. Certainly, Japan and Asia's "new Japans" 
do not base their versions of capitalism on the sort of dogmatic free market 
values Hudgins represents. My article is supportive of an industrial policy-style 
governmental role in sustaining private sector competitiveness. On this point 
Hudgins and I differ in ways that reflect the larger national debate in the United 
States over how best to respond to Japan's challenge. However, Hudgins then 
describes my suggestions for a national economic security policy as "fascism 
with a friendly face." If this is true, then George Bush, Bill Clinton, and Ross 
Perot also must be "friendly faced fascists," because they have mentioned 
comparable approaches. Hudgins hedges his critique by noting that "Olsen 
does not hold such a view explicitly," but then says my approach "amounts to 
a dictatorship of technocrats, a modem equivalent of Mussolini's Fascist Grand 
Council." Let me correct all this by noting that I hold no such "fascist" views 
explicitly or implicitly and the strawmen Hudgins criticizes are figments of his 
imagination. 
Moving on to the security relationships, Hudgins skewers me and other 
critics of Japan for "overlookling] the extent to which Washington has sought 
to restrict Japanese military activities since the end of World War II." I cannot 
speak for other critics of Japan, but I certainly have not overlooked it. In fact, 
I stressed it in my analysis and have done so elsewhere. Ironically, Hudgins 
resorts to a quote from the movie godfather, Don Corleone - "Keep your 
friends close, but your enemies closer" - to suggest that existing American 
strategic constraints on Japan are in U.S. interests. Well, they may be if one 
considers Japan an enemy. Evidently Hudgins does think of Japan in that light 
but - as my article goes to great pains to clear - I do not treat Japan as an 
enemy. It is an economic rival that challenges crucial U.S. interests in the 
post-cold war era in ways that require a fundamental reappraisal of U.S. policies 
regarding Japan. The distinction between an enemy, as Hudgins uses the term, 
and my use of "challenger" is more than semantic. It is a critical nuance in my 
analysis that Hudgins for some reason refused to accept at face value. 
Hudgins correctly points to a need for "analysis of American and Japanese 
regional interests in Asia." It was not presented in my article because that was 
not its topic. I have done so previously and in forthcoming analyses elsewhere. 
More important, other American, Japanese, and other Asian analysts are reas-
sessing this regional issue in the context of post-cold war circumstances. So 
far most of them have made assumptions about the inherent soundness of 
existing U.S.-Japanese relationships as the foundation for future regional security 
assessments. The main reason I wrote the article was to raise necessary questions 
about the wisdom of Americans retaining the relationship as it now exists. I 
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also wanted to explore some new approaches to the relationship that could 
make it far healthier for both sides in the long run, and to help to recreate the 
foundations of Asia-Pacific regional security on a far more durable footing. If 
that is done, the United States and Japan should be in much better positions 
to address their respective security interests. 
Moving on to Elegant's critique, I at first thought I was going to be 
praised-witness the use of "incisive," "stimulating,'' "ingenious," and "brilliant," 
in the first two paragraphs of his comments. Alas, this did not last. Therefore, 
let me address the major specific criticisms raised by Elegant. He says I "discount 
the need for conventional military forces." No I don't; not in the article or 
elsewhere. They continue to play an important and valid role in the region. 
This is as true of Asian forces as it is of U.S. forces. If I thought otherwise, it 
would be hypocritical of me to teach what I do where I do. My point was, 
and is, that there is a relative shift occurring toward economic factors in calculating 
national power and the United States should incorporate that shift more . 
thoroughly into its national policies. · 
Elegant suggests my proposals "would virtually declare a state of hostility · 
between the United States and Japan" and refers to "an open declaration of · 
American hostility." In fact, I explicitly say exactly the opposite. In this regard. 
Elegant (like Hudgins) either misunderstood my points or refuses to accept . 
their nuances. Similarly, he speculates about the creation of a power vacuum 
and suggests that I encourage Japan to extend its power. First, I do not share 
his concern about the much vaunted potential power vacuum in Asia should . 
the United States alter the ways it maintains a military presence in the Pacific. 
Asians can maintain a viable balance of power in their region that would 
accommodate to several variations of a U.S. military. presence. Secondly, I do 
not fear the prospect that Japan will engage in irrational self-destructive behavior 
militarily. In fact, judging from their negative comments alxmtJapanese potentiaIS, 
it seems that I trust the Japanese in this regard more, than either Elegant or 
Hudgins do. · · · 
Elegant further suggests that my proposals would lead to "a state of 
virtual economic war between" the United States and Japan. That is his view, 
not mine. I think Japan's economic challenge to the United States can be the 
foreign focal point for a restructured U.S. competitiveness campaign without 
becoming a surrogate for war to an American nation grown all too accustomed 
to being governed by a national security state. When I refer to a "war-surrogate" 
in the article, it is clear that I am dealing with a substitute situation. I should 
note, however, that there are many prominent American business· critics of 
Japan who would respond to Elegant's suggestion about a future economic 
war by asserting that we have been in one for years but only Japan iS actively 
pursuing an effective strategy. I do sympathize with these crities' sense of 
urgency about developing an American economic strategy ·capable of dealing 
with the pressing challenges the United States faces, but that does not equate 
to the heated views ascribed to me by Elegant. · · · 
Elegant then moves on to attack a number of other stciwmen. I am 
accused of wanting to make Japan "Public Enemy Number One," "The single 
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enemy on whom all misfortunes can be blamed," a "mortal threat," and "a 
Japanese Lucifer." All I can say is that, as a journalist, Elegant has a vivid 
imagination and a flare for the creative phrase. In fact, my point was to treat 
Japan as a serious economic challenger whose rivalry with the United States is 
of national importance to Americans. My article pointedly states the United 
States has no "need for a demon to sustain a national security state" and that 
"Americans must be careful not to demonize Japan." Even if the United States 
had such a need, Japan scarcely ftlls the bill. Equally important, early in my 
article I emphasize that "The United States cannot solve its domestic problems 
at the expense of foreign competitors; Americans must solve their own problems." 
To ascribe the characterizations Elegant does to my article twists its meaning 
and intent beyond recognition. 
Elegant thinks "To target Japan in a non-hostile fashion" (as I advocate) 
is an oxymoron. Well, it is not an oxymoron to me, but it does require new 
thinking about hoary images of "threat perception" on the part of American 
leaders. He suggests "non-hostile targeting is simplistic." On the contrary, it is 
extraordinarily complicated and carries with it an appreciation for nuances in 
the changing U.S.-Japan relationship that I emphasized and neither Elegant nor 
Hudgins reflected in their critiques. 
Elegant raises another strawman by attacking "a conscious conspiracy." 
My article does not contend there is one in Japan and it is not the basis of my 
proposals. Elegant then erects a truly major strawman by alleging that my 
proposals for bureaucratic reforms dwell on putting "academic strategists" and 
the military in key positions of economic power. I recommended neither. In 
fact, my references to the need for more Asianists in U.S. policymaking circles 
pointedly cited functional experts in Japanese and other Asian affairs as a key 
talent pool on which to draw. Most of these people probably would not be 
academics. As a long term academic, I share Elegant's skepticism of the efficacy 
of transforming academics into Washington policymakers. Few of us have the 
background or temperament to be decisionmakers. The people I had in mind 
would come from the ranks of business, finance, think tanks, the legal profession, 
the Congress and its staff, and - yes - even journalism. When appropriate, 
academic specialists in Asian affairs also should be called upon. Incidentally, it 
is not a "descent to academic infighting" to note the dispute between the 
sc:rcalled " chrysanthemum club" and the "revisionists." This may be more visible 
in academe, but it exists throughout the non-academic ranks of Japan experts 
too. Moreover, the revisionist Japan specialists I favor in the article are not 
"certifiably anti-Japanese" as Elegant states. To be sure, there are racist ''.Japan 
bashers" in the United States, but most revisionist experts are well qualified in 
Japanese affairs and respect Japan's achievements. 
Elegant exaggerates this bureaucratic strawman even further by sug-
gesting that I want to put the military in charge and would give the CIA a "vital 
economic role." In fact, my article suggests limited roles for each - smaller 
than the uniformed military would probably welcome in a revamped DOD and 
larger than the CIA now envisions. My article stresses the non-military nature 
of the challenge the United States faces and the necessity for a far less militarized 
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response than the United States had grown accustomed to during the cold war. 
In regard to the CIA's role, I do not see an expanded CIA informational role 
setving the private sector as at all "vital," but only as a useful supplement. 1hat 
suggestion was inserted merely as an example of how cold war-vintage federal 
institutions could usefully be adapted to post-cold war circumstances. TI1is was 
most definitely not offered in a sinister fashion. In fact, the underlying notion 
behind my article, which I probably should have made explicit, is that the 
proposed changes in U.S.-Japanese relations would likely occur while the United 
States is experiencing substantial conversion to a post-cold war "peace time" 
economy. I did not make that context explicit because it seems such an obvious 
given in the present security environment. 
I am not sure why Elegant perceived a "theological" tone in my article 
when it never moves beyond secular affairs, but I will admit to a degree of 
polemicism. If one is ttying to make a point about new policy options, there · 
is no point in putting one's candle under a basket, if I may be permitted a 
theological metaphor. 
Elegant cautions me that I "must know that you do not yell at Japanese 
if you want to get results." I am, indeed, aware of that. 1hat was why I suggested ... 
Americans suck in their breath and tell Japan that petpetuation of the existing .· 
relationship is muzukashii (saying no by indirection) and that the security treaty 
"should be allowed to languish and die out, part of America's phased adjustment 
to a post-cold war world." None of this qualifies as "yelling at Japanese." These 
approaches are gradual and incremental. In fact, if I yell at anyone in the article 
it is at my fellow Americans who need to be shaken from their reveries about . 
U.S.-Japanese harmony. Elegant's final argument about the need for the United · 
States to "teach the Japanese" and that "changing Japan will be· a long and • 
arduous process" proves my point. While all societies evolve, including Japan's,·· 
it is incredibly presumptuous and arrogant of Americans (such as Elegant and ·. 
many others) to think we have a right to "change Japan" to make it conform 
to our rules of the game. 1hat is the basic fallacy behind the much lauded U.S.·· 
effort at the Structural Impediments Initiative talks. Japan is responding to such 
pressures in pursuit of its own interests. On balance, however, it is not so much •· 
Japan that needs to change, it is the United States. · 
Over time, Japan will adapt to what it wants, when it wants. 1hat is a 
matter for the Japanese to decide, not Americans. In the meantime, Americans 
can best devote their efforts to changing those things in the United States that 
truly need changing and to reforming U.S. foreign, defense, and economic 
policies to meet the challenges of the post-cold war era. As long as Japan' is 
the leading example and symbol of that challenge from Asia, and as. long as 
cultural factors promise to inhibit American competitiveness vis-a-vis Asia versus 
Europe, then Japan warrants being the focal point of an economics-Oriented 
post-cold war set of international and domestic U.S. policies. 1his was the basic 
point of my analysis and I stand by it. . · 
To conclude, lest Orbis readers think the ideas I expressed in the article 
were so extreme that they are beyond the mainstream (as the two commentators 
clearly believe), let me quote a key portion a New Yorn Times editorial entitled 
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"America Isn't Asia's Cop" (August 10, 1992) which says: "Even before the cold 
war ended, the mission of U.S. forces in the Pacific had shifted from containing 
Communism to keeping potential Asian rivals at arm's length from each other. 
niere's no good reason for America to bear this regional security burden alone 
as Asian societies grow increasingly rich and powerful." Part of the process of 
adjusting to a new economic and security environment in Asia in which the 
United States, Japan, and a range of other countries play different roles than 
they did during the cold war, and in which the United States behaves as what 
Jeane Kirkpatrick correctly described as a "normal country," entails dealing with 
Japan in a dear-eyed fashion as my article does. 
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